We consider a framework in which a group of agents communicates by means of emails, with the possibility of replies, forwards and blind carbon copies (BCC). We study the epistemic consequences of such email exchanges by introducing an appropriate epistemic language and semantics. This allows us to find out what agents learn from the emails they receive and to determine when a group of agents acquires common knowledge of the fact that an email was sent. We also show that in our framework from the epistemic point of view the BCC feature of emails cannot be simulated using messages without BCC recipients.
INTRODUCTION

Motivation
Email is by now a prevalent form of communication. From the point of view of distributed programming it looks superficially like an instance of multicasting: one agent sends a message to a group of agents. However, such features as forwarding and the blind carbon copy (BCC) make it a more complex form of communication.
The reason is that each email implicitly carries epistemic information concerning (among others) common knowledge of the group involved in it of the fact that it was sent. As a result forwarding leads to nested common knowledge and typically involves at each level different groups of agents. In turn, the BCC feature results in different information gain by the regular recipients and the BCC recipients. In fact, in Section 7 we show that the BCC feature is new from the epistemic point of view.
To be more specific, suppose that an agent i forwards a message m to a group G. Then the group G ∪ {i} acquires (among others) common knowledge of the fact that the group A consisting of the sender and the receivers of m has common knowledge of m. Next, suppose that an agent i sends a message m to a group G with a BCC to a group B. Then the group G ∪ {i} acquires common knowledge of m, while each member of B separately acquires with the sender of m common knowledge of the fact that the group G ∪ {i} acquires common knowledge of m.
Combining forward and BCC we can realize epistemic formulas C A 1 ...C A k m, where C A stands for "the group A has common knowledge of," of arbitrary depth. Further, this combination can lead to a(n undesired) situation in which a BCC recipient of an email reveals his status to others by using the reply-all feature. In general, a chain of forwards of arbitrary length can reveal to a group of agents that an agent was a BCC recipient of the original email. We conclude that the email exchanges, as studied here, are essentially different from multicasting.
Epistemic consequences of email exchanges are occasionally raised by researchers in various contexts. For instance, Babai [1990] mentions "some issues of email ethics" by describing a case of an email discussion in which some researchers were not included (and hence could not build upon the reported results).
So when studying email exchanges a natural question arises: what are their knowledge-theoretic consequences? To put it more informally: after an email exchange took place, who knows what? Can sending emails to more and more new recipients ever create common knowledge? (Our Main Theorem shows that the answer is "No.")
To be more specific consider the following example to which we shall return later.
Example 1.1. Assume the following email exchange involving four people, Alma, Bob, Clare, and Daniel. It is natural to ask for example what Alma has actually learned from Bob's email. Also, do all four people involved in this exchange have common knowledge of the original email by Clare?
To answer such questions we study email exchanges focusing on relevant features that we encounter in most email systems. More specifically, we study the following form of email communication.
-Each email has a sender, a nonempty set of regular recipients and a (possibly empty) set of blind carbon copy (BCC) recipients. Each recipient receives a copy of the message and is only aware of the regular recipients and not of the BCC recipients (except himself). -In the case of a reply to or a forward of a message, the unaltered original message is included. -In a reply or a forward, one can append new information to the original message one replies to or forwards.
To formalize agents' knowledge resulting from an email exchange we introduce an appropriate epistemic language and the corresponding semantics. The resulting model of email communication differs from the ones that were studied in other papers in which only limited aspects of emails have been considered. These papers are discussed in the following. In our setup the communication is synchronous. While this is a simplification we find that it is natural to clarify email communication in such a setting first before considering various alternatives. In the last section we address this point further when suggesting further research.
Contributions and Plan of the Article
To study the relevant features of email communication we introduce in the next section a carefully chosen language describing emails. We make a distinction between a message, which is sent to a public recipient list, and an email, which consists of a message and a set of BCC recipients. This distinction is relevant because a forward email contains an earlier message, without the list of BCC recipients. We also introduce the notion of a legal state that imposes a natural restriction on the considered sets of emails by stipulating an ordering of the emails. For example, an email needs to precede any forward of it.
To reason about the knowledge of the agents after an email exchange has taken place we introduce in Section 3 an appropriate epistemic language. Its semantics takes into account the uncertainty of the recipients of an email about its set of BCC recipients. This semantics allows us to evaluate epistemic formulas in legal states, in particular the formulas that characterize the full knowledge-theoretic effect of an email.
Apart from factual information each email also carries epistemic information. In Section 4 we characterize the latter. It allows us to clarify which groups of agents acquire common knowledge as a result of an email and what is the resulting information gain for each agent.
In Section 5 we present the main result of the article, which clarifies when a group of agents can acquire common knowledge of the formula expressing the fact that an email has been sent. This characterization in particular sheds light on the epistemic consequences of BCC. The proof is given in Section 6.
Then in Section 7 we show that in our framework BCC cannot be simulated using messages without BCC recipients. Finally, in Section 8 we provide a characterization of legal states in terms of properly terminating email exchanges.
Related Work
The study of the epistemic effects of communication in distributed systems originated in the eighties and led to the seminal book [Fagin et al. 1995] . The relevant literature, including Chandy and Misra [1986] , deals with the communication forms studied within the context of distributed computing, notably asynchronous send.
One of the main issues studied in these frameworks has been the analysis of the conditions that are necessary for acquiring common knowledge. In particular, Halpern and Moses [1990] showed that common knowledge cannot be attained in the systems in which the message delivery is not guaranteed. More recently this problem was investigated in Ben-Zvi and Moses [2010] for synchronous systems with known bounds on message transmission in which processes share a global clock. The authors extended the causality relation of Lamport [1978] between messages in distributed systems to synchronous systems with known bounds on message transmission and proved that in such systems a so-called pivotal event is needed in order to obtain common knowledge. This in particular generalizes the previous result of Chandy and Misra [1986] concerning acquisition of common knowledge in distributed systems with synchronous communication.
The epistemic effects of other forms of communication were studied in numerous papers. In particular, in Pacuit and Parikh [2007] the communicative acts are assumed to consist of an agent j "reading" an arbitrary propositional formula from another agent i. The idea of an epistemic content of an email is implicitly present in Parikh and Ramanujam [2003] , where a formal model is proposed that formalizes how communication changes the knowledge of a recipient of the message.
In Benthem et al. [2006] a dynamic epistemic logic modelling effects of communication and change is introduced and extensively studied. Further, in Wang et al. [2010] an epistemic logic was proposed to reason about information flow with respect to underlying communication channels. Pacuit [2010] surveys these and related approaches and discusses the used epistemic, dynamic epistemic and doxastic logics.
Most related to the work here reported are the following two references. Apt et al. [2009] studied knowledge and common knowledge in a set up in which the agents send and forward propositional formulas in a social network. However, the forward did not include the original message and the BCC feature was absent. More recently, in Sietsma and van Eijck [2011] explicit messages are introduced in a dynamic epistemic logic to analyze a similar setting, though BCC was simulated as discussed in Section 7. In both papers it is assumed that the number of messages is finite. In contrast, in the setting of this article the forward includes the original message, which results directly in an infinite number of messages and emails. Finally, let us mention that the concept of forwarding is occasionally mentioned in the context of distributed computing; see, for instance, Lien andÖlveczky [2009] .
PRELIMINARIES
Messages
In this section we define the notion of a message. In the next section we introduce emails as a simple extension of the messages. We assume a non-empty and finite set of agents Ag = {1, ..., n} and a set of notes. Each note is an abstraction of the contents of the message or an email.
We make a number of assumptions. Firstly, we assume that initially each agent i has a set of notes L i he knows. He does know which notes belong to the other agents and does not know the overall set of notes. Furthermore, we assume that the agents only exchange messages about the notes. We also assume that an agent can send a message to other agents containing a note only if he holds it initially or has learnt it through a message he received earlier.
This minimal set up precludes the possibility that the agents can use messages to implement some agreed in advance protocol, such as that sending two specific notes by an agent would reveal that he has some specific knowledge. It allows us to focus instead on the epistemic information caused directly by the structure of the messages and emails.
Of course in reality emails may contain propositional or epistemic information which affects knowledge of the agents at a deeper level than modelled here by means of abstract notes. To reason about notes containing such information one could add on the top of our framework an appropriate logic. If every note n contains some formula ϕ n , then one could just add the implications n → ϕ n to this logic to ensure that every agent who knows the note n also knows the formula ϕ n .
We inductively define messages as follows, where we assume that G = ∅:
-m := s(i, l, G); the message containing note l, sent by agent i to the group G, -m := f (i, l.m , G); the forwarding by agent i of the message m with added note l, sent to the group G.
So the agents can send a message with a note or forward a message with a new note appended, where the latter covers the possibility of a reply or a reply-all. Appending such a new note to a forwarded message is a natural feature present in most email systems. To allow for the possibility of sending a forward without appending a new note, we can assume there exists a note true that is held by all agents and identify true.m with m.
If m is a message, then we denote by S(m) and R(m), respectively, the singleton set consisting of the agent sending m and the group of agents receiving m. So for the given messages m we have S(m) = {i} and R(m) = G. We do allow that S(m) ⊆ R(m), that is, that one sends a message to oneself.
Special forms of the forward messages can be used to model reply messages. Given f (i, l.m, G) with i ∈ R(m), using G = S(m) we obtain the customary reply message and using G = S(m) ∪ R(m) we obtain the customary reply-all message. (In the customary email systems there is syntactic difference between a forward and a reply to these two groups of agents, but the effect of both messages is exactly the same, so we ignore this difference.) In the examples we write s(i, l, j) instead of s(i, l, {j}), etc.
Emails
An interesting feature of most email systems is that of the blind carbon copy (BCC). We study here the epistemic effects of sending an email with BCC recipients and will now include this feature in our presentation.
In the previous section we defined messages that have a sender and a group of recipients. Now we define the notion of an email which allows the additional possibility of sending a BCC of a message. The BCC recipients are not listed in the list of recipients, therefore we have not included them in the definition of a message. Formally, by an email we mean a construct of the form m B , where m is a message and B ⊆ Ag is a possibly empty set of BCC recipients. Given a message m we call each email m B a full version of m.
An email m B is delivered to the regular recipients, that is, to the set R(m) and to the set B of the BCC recipients. Each of them receives the message m. Only the sender of m B , that is, agent i, where S(m) = {i}, knows the set B. Each agent i ∈ B only knows that the set B contains at least him.
Since the set of the BCC recipients is "secret," it does not appear in a forward. That is, the forward of an email m B with added note l is the message f (i, l.m, G) or an email f (i, l.m, G) C , in which B is not mentioned. This is consistent with the way BCC is handled in most email systems, such as gmail or email systems based on the postfix mail server. However, this forward may be sent not only by a sender or a regular recipient of m B , but also by a BCC recipient. Clearly, the fact that an agent was a BCC recipient of an email is revealed at the moment he forwards the message.
A natural question arises: what if someone is both a regular recipient and a BCC recipient of an email? In this case, no one (not even this BCC recipient himself) would ever notice that this recipient was also a BCC recipient since everyone can explain his knowledge of the message by the fact that he was a regular recipient. Only the sender of the message would know that this agent was also a BCC recipient. This fact does not change anything and hence we assume that for every email m B we have (S(m) ∪ R(m)) ∩ B = ∅.
Example 2.1. Using the just-introduced language we can formalize the story from Example 1.1 as follows, where we abbreviate Alma to a, etc.: 
Legal States
Our goal is to analyze knowledge of agents after some email exchange took place. To this end we need to define a possible collection of sent emails.
First of all, we shall assume that every message is used only once. In other words, for each message m there is at most one full version of m, that is, an email of the form m B . The rationale behind this decision is that a sender of m B and m B might equally well send a single email m B∪B . This assumption can be summarized as a statement that the agents do not have "second thoughts" about the recipients of their emails. It also simplifies subsequent considerations.
In this work we have decided not to impose a total ordering on the emails in our model, for example by giving each email a time stamp. This makes the model a lot simpler. Also, many interesting questions can be answered without imposing such a total ordering. For example, we can investigate the existence of common knowledge in a group of agents after an email exchange perfectly well without knowing the exact order of the emails that were sent.
However, we have to impose some ordering on the sets of emails. For example, we need to make sure that the agents only send information they actually know. Moreover, a forward can only be sent after the original email was sent. We will introduce the minimal partial ordering that takes care of such issues.
First, we define by structural induction the factual information FI(m) contained in a message m as follows:
Informally, the factual information is the set of notes which occur somewhere in the message, including those occurring in forwarded messages.
We will use the concept of a state to model the effect of an email exchange. A state s = (E, L) is a tuple consisting of a finite set E of emails that were sent and a sequence L = (L 1 , ..., L n ) of sets of notes for all agents. The idea of these sets is that each agent i initially holds the notes in L i . We use E s and L s to denote the corresponding elements of a state s, and L 1 , ..., L n to denote the elements of L.
We say that a state s = (E, L) is legal if a strict partial ordering (in short, an spo) ≺ on E exists that satisfies the following conditions.
Condition L.1 states that the agents can only forward messages they previously received. Conditions L.2 and L.3 state that if an agent sends or forwards a note that he did not initially hold, then he must have learnt it by means of an earlier email.
So a state is legal if its emails can be partially ordered in such a way that every forward is preceded by its original message, and for every note sent in an email there is an explanation how the sender of the email learnt this note. As every partial ordering can be extended to a linear ordering, the emails of a legal state can be ordered in such a way that each agent has a linear ordering on its emails. However, such a linear ordering does not need to be unique. For example, the emails s(i, l, j) ∅ and s(i, l, k) ∅ can always be ordered in both ways.
Moreover, a strict partial ordering that ensures that a state is legal does not need to be unique either and incompatible minimal partial orderings can exist. Here is an example provided by one of the referees. Suppose that l ∈ L i \ L j and j ∈ G 1 ∩ G 2 , and consider the set of messages {s(i, l, G 1 ), s(i, l, G 2 ), s(j, l, k)}. The resulting state (we identify here each message m with the email m ∅ ) is legal. There are two minimal spos that can be used to establish this, s(i, l, G 1 ) ≺ s(j, l, k) and s(i, l, G 2 ) ≺ s (j, l, k) . So we cannot conclude that any specific message sent by agent i has to precede the message sent by agent j, though we have to assume that at least one of them does.
This shows that the causal relation between emails essentially differs from the causal relation between messages in distributed systems, as studied in Lamport [1978] . Further, the assumption that communication is synchronous does not result in a unique spo on the considered emails.
EPISTEMIC LANGUAGE AND ITS SEMANTICS
We want to reason about the knowledge of the agents after an email exchange has taken place. For this purpose we use a language L of communication and knowledge defined as follows:
Here m denotes a message. The formula m expresses the fact that m has been sent in the past, with some unknown group of BCC recipients. The formula i m expresses the fact that agent i was involved in a full version of the message m, that is, he was either the sender, a recipient or a BCC recipient. The formula C G ϕ denotes common knowledge of the formula ϕ in the group G.
We use the usual abbreviations ∨, → and ↔ and use K i ϕ as an abbreviation of C {i} ϕ. The fact that an email with a certain set of BCC recipients was sent can be expressed in our language by the following abbreviation:
This formula expresses the fact that the message m was sent with exactly the group B as BCC recipients, which captures precisely the intended meaning of m B . The BCC recipients are distinguished from the regular recipients in R(m) by the fact that for any agent i in S(m) and R(m), the fact that i m holds follows from the fact that m holds. On the other hand, for the agents in B, the fact that i m holds follows from m B and not from m alone.
We now provide a semantics for this language interpreted on legal states, inspired by the epistemic logic and the history-based approaches of Pacuit and Parikh [2007] and Parikh and Ramanujam [2003] . For every agent i we define an indistinguishability relation ∼ i , where we intend s ∼ i s to mean that agent i cannot distinguish between the states s and s . We first define this relation on the level of emails as follows (recall that we assume that senders and regular recipients are not BCC recipients):
iff one of the following contingencies holds:
Condition (1) states that the sender of an email confuses it only with the email itself. In turn, condition (2) states that each regular recipient of an email who is not a sender confuses it with any email with the same message but possibly sent to a different BCC group. Finally, condition (3) states that each BCC recipient of an email confuses it with any email with the same message but sent to a possibly different BCC group of which he is also a member.
Example 3.1. Consider the emails e := s(i, l, j) ∅ and e := s(i, l, j) {k} . We have then e ∼ i e , e ∼ j e and e ∼ k e . Intuitively, agent j cannot distinguish between these two emails because he cannot see whether k is a BCC recipient. In contrast, agents i and k can distinguish between these two emails.
Next, we extend the indistinguishability relation to legal states by defining
iff all of the following hold:
So two states cannot be distinguished by an agent if they agree on his notes and their email sets look the same to him. Since we assume that the agents do not know anything about the other notes, we do not refer to the sets of notes of the other agents. Note that ∼ i is an equivalence relation.
Example 3.2. Consider the legal states s 1 and s 2 which are identical apart from their sets of emails:
We assume here that l ∈ L i and that in each state the emails are ordered by the textual ordering. So in the first state agent i sends a message with note l to agent j and then j forwards this message to agent o. Further, in the second state agent i sends the same message but with a BCC to agent k, and then both agent j and agent k forward the message to agent o.
From the definition it follows that s 1 ∼ i s 2 , s 1 ∼ j s 2 , s 1 ∼ k s 2 and s 1 ∼ o s 2 . For example, the first claim holds because, as noticed before, s(i, l, j) ∅ ∼ i s(i, l, j) {k} . Intuitively, in state s 1 agent i is aware that he sent a BCC to nobody, while in state s 2 he is aware that he sent a BCC to agent k. In turn, in both states s 1 and s 2 agent j is aware that he received the message s (i, l, j) and that he forwarded the email f (j, s(i, l, j) , o) ∅ . Intuitively, in state s 2 agent j does not notice the BCC of the message s(i, l, j) and is not aware of the email f (k, s(i, l, j) , o) ∅ .
In order to express common knowledge, we define for a group of agents G the relation ∼ G as the reflexive, transitive closure of i∈G ∼ i . Then we define the truth of a formula from our language in a state inductively as follows, where s = (E, L).
We say that ϕ is valid (and often just write 'ϕ' instead of 'ϕ is valid') if for all legal states s, s |= ϕ.
Even though this definition does not specify the form of communication, one can deduce from the definition of the relation ∼ that the communication is synchronous, that is, that each email is simultaneously received by all the recipients. We shall discuss this matter in more detail in Section 8. Note also that the condition of the form m B ∈ E present in the second clause implies that for every email m B the following equivalence is valid for all
This means that in every legal state (E, L) either all recipients of the email m B received it (when m B ∈ E) or none (when m B ∈ E).
The limited form of the introduced language implies that the agents cannot simulate a common "clock," using which they could deduce how many messages have been sent. Also, there is no common "blackboard," using which they could deduce how many messages have been sent by other agents between two consecutive messages they have received. Further, the agents do not have a local "clock," using which they could count how many messages they sent or received.
The following lemma clarifies when specific formulas are valid. In the sequel we shall use these observations implicitly. In the following we use the relation is part of on messages, defined inductively as follows:
is part of the message m.
The second item states that m → i m is valid either if i is a sender or a receiver of m (in that case actually i m is valid) or i forwarded the message m . The latter is also possible if i was a BCC receiver of m . The claimed equivalence holds thanks to condition L.1.
Example 3.4. To illustrate the definition of truth let us return to Example 3.2. In state s 2 agent j does not know that agent k received the message s(i, l, j) since he cannot distinguish s 2 from the state s 1 in which agent k did not receive this message. So s 2 |= ¬K j k s (i, l, j) holds.
On the other hand, in every legal state s 3 such that s 2 ∼ o s 3 both an email f (k, s(i, l, j) , o) C and a "justifying" email s(i, l, j) B have to exist such that s(i, p, j) B ≺ f (k, s(i, l, j) , o) C and k ∈ B, where ≺ is an spo such that the emails of s 3 satisfy conditions L.1-L.3 w.r.t. ≺. Consequently s 3 |= k s(i, l, j), so s 2 |= K o k s(i, l, j) holds, so by sending the forward agent k revealed himself to o as a BCC recipient.
We leave to the reader checking that both s 2 |= C {k,o} k s(i, l, j) and s 2 |= ¬C {j,o} k s(i, l, j) holds. In words, agents k and o have common knowledge that agent k was involved in a full version of the message s(i, l, j), while the agents j and o don't.
EPISTEMIC CONTENTS OF EMAILS
In Section 2.3 we defined the factual information contained in a message. Using the epistemic language introduced in the previous section we can define the epistemic information contained in a message or an email. First, we define it for messages as follows:
So the epistemic information contained in a message is the statement that the sender and receivers acquire common knowledge of the fact that the message was sent. In the case of a forward the epistemic information contained in the original message also becomes common knowledge. This results in nested common knowledge. In general, iterated forwards can lead to arbitary nestings of the common knowledge operator, each time involving a different group of agents.
The definition of the epistemic information contained in an email additionally needs to capture the information about the agents who are on the BCC list of an email. We define:
So EI(m B ) states that -the epistemic information contained in the message m holds, -the sender of the message and each separate agent on the BCC list have common knowledge of this epistemic information and of the fact that this agent received the message, -the sender knows the precise set of BCC recipients.
The following result clarifies the nature of the epistemic information contained in a message or an email.
THEOREM 4.1. The following equivalences are valid:
PROOF. Each relation ∼ j on the level of states is an equivalence relation, so for all formulas ϕ and G ⊆ Ag, the implication C G ϕ → ϕ, and hence in particular EI(m) → m and EI(m B ) → m B , is valid.
( (s(i, l, G) ).
For the forward messages we proceed by induction on the structure of the messages. Consider the message f (i, l.m, G) . The implication f (i, l.m, G) → m is valid, so by the induction hypothesis the implication f (i, l.m, G) → EI(m) is valid. Since we showed already that the implication f
( We conclude that the implication m B → EI(m B ) is valid. Trivially, EI(m B ) → m B is also valid.
Using this theorem we can determine "who knows what" after an email exchange E (taken from a legal state (E, L)) took place. The problem boils down to computing e∈E EI(e). When we are interested in a specific fact, for example whether after an email exchange E took place agent i knows a formula ψ, we simply need to establish the validity of the implication e∈E EI(e) → C i ψ.
Using the epistemic information contained in an email we can define the information gain of an agent resulting from sending or receiving of an email as follows.
We have then the following immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1. This should be contrasted with the information Alma had after she sent the email e 1 , which was EI(m ).
COMMON KNOWLEDGE
Our main objective is to clarify when a group of agents acquires common knowledge of the formula expressing that an email was sent. This can be done within our framework, which shows that it is appropriate for investigating epistemic consequences of email exchanges. First, given a set of emails E and a group of agents A, we define
When e ∈ E A we shall say that the email e is shared by the group A. Note that when |A| ≥ 3, then e ∈ E A iff A ⊆ S(m) ∪ R(m). When |A| = 2, then e ∈ E A also when ∃j ∈ B : A = S(m) ∪ {j}, and when |A| = 1, then e ∈ E A also when A = S(m) or ∃j ∈ B : A = {j}.
The following theorem summarizes our results. It provides a simple way of testing whether a message or an email is a common knowledge of a group of agents.
THEOREM 5.1 (MAIN THEOREM). Consider a legal state s = (E, L) and a group of agents A.
(1) s |= C A m iff there is m B ∈ E A such that m → m is valid.
(2) Suppose that |A| ≥ 3. Then s |= C A m B iff the following hold, where, recall, Ag is the set of agents:
Part (1) shows that when we limit our attention to messages, then things are as expected: a group of agents acquires common knowledge of a message m iff they receive an email a part of which is m. If we limit our presentation to emails with the empty BCC sets we get as a direct corollary the counterpart of this result for a simplified framework with messages only.
To understand part (2) note that it states that s |= C A m B iff -the email m B involves all agents, -for every agent i that is on the BCC list of m B there is an email shared by the group A that proves that i forwarded message m, -there is an email shared by the group A that proves the existence of the message m.
The first of these three items is striking and shows that common knowledge of an email is rare. C3 is just the condition used in part (1). So an email m B such that A ⊆ S(m) ∪ R(m) does ensure that the group of agents A acquires common knowledge of m. However, the group A can never know what was the set of the BCC recipients of m B unless it was the set Ag \ (S(m) ∪ R(m)) and there is a proof for this fact in the form of the "disclosing emails" from all members of B.
Having in mind that the usual purpose of the BCC is just to inform its recipients of a certain message (that they are supposed to "keep for themselves"), we can conclude that the presence of the BCC feature essentially precludes the possibility that a group of agents can acquire common knowledge of an email. Informally, the fact that the BCC feature creates "secret information" has as a consequence that common knowledge of an email is only possible if this secret information is completely disclosed to the group in question. Moreover, the message has to be sent to all agents.
Note that using the notion of the information gain introduced in the previous section we can determine for each agent in a group A what he learned from a message m or an email m B . In some circumstances, like when m = s(i, l, G) and A ⊆ G ∪ {i}, this information gain can imply C A m. However, the definition of EI(m B ) implies that the information gain can imply C A m B only in the obvious case when A = S(m).
Finally, this result crucially depends on the fact that the notes are uninterpreted. If we allowed emails that contain propositional formulas of the language L from Section 3 augmented by the notes, then an agent could communicate to a group A the fact that he sent an email m B (with a precise set of the BCC recipients). Then m B would become a common knowledge of the group A.
As an aside let us mention that there is a corresponding result for the case when |A| < 3, as well. However, it involves a tedious case analysis concerning the possible relations between A, S(m), R(m) and B, so we do not present it here. Alma's set of notes in s consists of l while the sets of notes of Bob, Clare and Daniel are empty. Note that s is legal. We have then s |= C {a,b,c,d} s(c, l, {a, d}) .
The reason is that we have
Indeed, for no m *  ∈ {m, m , m , f (a, m , s(c, l, {a, d}) is not common knowledge then its forward f (a, m, b) is not common knowledge either. Another way to derive this is directly from the Main Theorem. Namely, we have
The reason is that condition C2 does not hold since no email shared by {a, b, c, d} exists that proves that Alma received m . In contrast,
does hold, since the email e 3 is shared by {a, c, d}. Further, if Alma had used the forward f (a, m , {b, c, d}) ∅ , then condition C2 would hold and we could conclude for this modified state s that
PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
We establish first a number of auxiliary lemmas. We shall use a new strict partial ordering on emails. We define Given a set of emails E and E ⊆ E we then define the downward closure of E by
The set of emails E on which the downward closure of E depends will always be clear from the context.
Next, we introduce two operations on states. Assume a state (E, L) and an email m B ∈ E.
We define the state
Intuitively, s\m B is the result of removing the email m B from the state s, followed by augmenting the sets of notes of its recipients in such a way that they initially already had the notes they would have acquired from m B . Note that s \ m B is a legal state if m B is an <-maximal element of E.
Next, given C ⊆ B we define the state
Intuitively, s[m B →C ] is the result of shrinking the set of BCC recipients of m from B to C, followed by an appropriate augmenting of the sets of notes of the agents that no longer receive m.
Note that s[m B →C ] is a legal state if there is no forward of m by an agent i ∈ B \ C, that is, no email of the form f (i, l.m, G) 
We shall need the following lemma that clarifies the importance of the set E A of emails. LEMMA 6.1. Consider a legal state s = (E, L) and a group of agents A. Then for some L the state s := ((E A ) ≤ , L ) is legal and s ∼ A s .
PROOF. We prove that for all
Iterating this process we get the desired conclusion.
Suppose
Then s 1 is a legal state and s ∼ j s 1 . Next, define Using this lemma we now establish two auxiliary results concerning common knowledge of the formula i m or of its negation. LEMMA 6.2.
To illustrate various alternatives listed in (1) note that each of the following emails in E ensures that s |= C {j} i m, where in each case m is the corresponding send message: f (k, q.s(i, l, G) , H) {j} , s(k, l, i) {j} , f (i, q.s(k, l, G), H) {j} , s(j, l, G) {i} .
The first four of these emails imply s |= C {j} i m by the first clause of (1), the last one by the second clause. 
If for some note l and groups G and C we have f (i, l.m, G) 
In the former case we use the fact that the implication f (i, l.m, G) → i m is valid. In the latter case m → f (i, l.m, G) (2) By the definition of m B , the fact that the C A operator distributes over the conjunction, part (1) of the Main Theorem and Lemma 6.2 we have
Then properties C3-C6 hold. But |A| ≥ 3 and s |= C A m imply that no conjunct of C5 holds. Hence property C1 holds.
Further, since |A| ≥ 3 the first disjunct of each conjunct in C4 does not hold. So the second disjunct of each conjunct in C4 holds, which implies property C2.
(⇐) Suppose properties C1-C3 hold. It suffices to establish properties C4-C6.
For i ∈ S(m) ∪ R(m) we have m → i m. So C2 implies property C4. Further, since C1 holds, properties C5 and C6 hold vacuously.
ANALYSIS OF BCC
In our framework we built emails out of messages using the BCC feature. So it is natural to analyze whether and in what sense the emails can be reduced to messages without BCC recipients.
Given a send email s(i, l, G) B , where B = {j 1 , ..., j k }, we can simulate it by the following sequence of messages:
Analogous simulation can be formed for the forward email f (i, l.m, G) B . At first sight, it seems that this simulation has exactly the same epistemic effect as the original email with the BCC recipients. In both states, each agent j 1 , ..., j k receives separately a copy of the message and only the sender of this message is aware of this. However, there are two subtle differences.
First of all, there is a syntactic difference between message that agents j 1 , ..., j k receive in the original case and in the simulation. In the original case they receive exactly the message m, and in the simulation they receive a forward of it. This also means that if they reply to or forward the message, there is a syntactic difference in this reply or forward. This difference is purely syntactic and does not essentially influence the knowledge of the agents, even though it clearly influences the truth value of the formula j m, which is true for j ∈ {j 1 , ..., j k } in the original case but not in the simulation.
The second difference is more fundamental. If agents j 1 , ..., j k are BCC recipients of m and they do not send a reply to or a forward of m, then each of them can be sure that no other agent but the sender of m knows he was a BCC recipient. Indeed, in our framework there is no message the sender of m could send to another agent, that expresses that agents j 1 , ..., j k were the BCC recipients of m.
In the case of the simulation however, these recipients do not receive a BCC but a forward. Since these forwards may have additional BCC recipients of which agents j 1 , ..., j k are unaware, they cannot be sure that the other agents do not know that they received a forward of the message. Furthermore, the sender of m could also forward the forward he sent to j 1 , ..., j k without informing them about it, thus also revealing their knowledge of m.
A concrete example that shows this difference is the following.
Example 7.1. Let
Then s |= K 3 ¬K 2 K 3 s (1, l, 2) , that is, agent 3 is sure that agent 2 does not know about his knowledge of the message s (1, l, 2) . A simulation of this email without a BCC recipient would result in the state t with (we abbreviate here each email m ∅ to m) s(1, l, 2) , 3)}.
Now consider a state t with: s(1, l, 2) , 3), f (1, f (1, s(1, l, 2) , 3), 2)}.
Clearly t ∼ 3 t and t |= K 2 K 3 s (1, l, 2) . This shows that t |= K 3 ¬K 2 K 3 s (1, l, 2) .
This argument can be made more general as follows. In the context of a state we will identify each message m with the email m ∅ . Then we have the following result. 
PROOF. Agent j is a BCC recipient of m in s, so by the definition of the semantics s |= K j m. We will first show that s |= K j ¬K k K j m. Take some state t such that s ∼ j t. Then by the definition of the semantics there is some group C such that m C ∈ E t and j ∈ C. Suppose that m is a send email, say m = s (i, l, G) . For the case that m is a forward email the reasoning is analogous. Let u be the state like t, but with
Note that we implicitly assume that no full version of s (i, l, j) is already present in E t . If there were such a full version, we could do the same construction without adding s (i, l, j) to E t .
Since there are no forwards of m by j or to j in E, and s ∼ j t, there are no forwards of m by j or to j in E t . This shows that u is a legal state and that there are no forwards of m to j in E u so u |= K j m. Clearly, for every k ∈ S(m) ∪ {j} we have t ∼ k u. So t |= K k K j m, which shows that s |= K j ¬K k K j m.
Take now any set of messages M such that (M, L) is legal and suppose (M, L) |= K j m. Then by the Main Theorem there is some message m in which agent j was involved that implies that message m was sent. By the requirements on the legal states we know that there is such a message m of which agent j was a recipient, and not the sender, since agents can only send information they initially knew or received through some earlier message. Since there are no BCC recipients in M, we conclude that agent j is a regular recipient of m that he received from some other agent and that m → m is valid.
Define the set of messages M by
Note that (M , L) is a legal state, and (M , L) |= K k m . Since j is a regular recipient of m , m → K j m is valid and since m → m is also valid this implies that (M , L) |= L) . This shows that (M, L) |= K j ¬K k K j m. In view of our assumption that (M, L) |= K j m we conclude that (M, L) |= K j m ∧ K j ¬K k K j m.
In this theorem we assume that for the BCC recipient j of the message m there are no forwards of m to j or by j. The theorem shows that under these assumptions, s and (M, L) can be distinguished by an epistemic formula concerning the message m. We will now show that these assumptions are necessary. (1, s(1, l, 2) , 3), f (2, s(1, l, 2) , 3)}.
We can see that (M, L) is a perfect BCC-free simulation of s: for every formula ϕ that holds in s, if we replace the occurrences of 3 s (1, l, 2) in ϕ by f (1, s(1, l, 2) , 3) then the result holds in (M, L) . The reason that we can find such a set M is that in E there is a forward of s(1, l, 2) to agent 3. This reveals the 'secret' that agent 3 knows about s (1, l, 2) and then the fact that agent 3 was a BCC recipient of s (1, l, 2) is no longer relevant.
Example 7.4. A similar example shows the importance of the assumption that there are no forwards by a BCC recipient. Take a legal state s = (E, L) with E = {s(1, l, 2) {3} , f (3, s(1, l, 2) , 2)} and M = {s(1, l, 2), f (1, s(1, l, 2) , 3), f (3, f (1, s(1, l, 2) , 3), 2)}.
Again, for every formula ϕ that holds in s, if we replace the occurrences of 3 s (1, l, 2) in ϕ by f (1, s(1, l, 2) , 3) then the result holds in (M, L) . Now the reason is that agent 3 informed agent 2 that he was a BCC recipient of s (1, l, 2) in s by sending a forward of this message, so again the fact that agent 3 knows s (1, l, 2) is not a secret anymore.
It is interesting to note that the impossibility of simulating BCC by means of messages is in fact caused by our choice of uninterpreted notes as the basic content of the messages. If our framework allowed one to send messages containing more complex information, for example a formula of the form j m, the sender of m could have informed other agents who were the BCC recipients. Then in Example 7.1 we could consider a state s with E s = {s(1, n, 2) {3} , s(1, 3 s(1, n, 2) , 2)}.
By appropriately extending our semantics we would have then s ∼ 3 s and s |= K 2 K 3 s(1, n, 2), and hence s |= K 3 ¬K 2 K 3 s(1, n, 2), so the difference between the two states s and t would then disappear.
Similarly, if we allowed epistemic formulas as contents of the messages, then in the given example agent 1 could use the message s (1, K 3 s(1, n, 2) , 2) to inform agent 2 that he BCC'ed agent 3 when sending the message s (1, n, 2) . We leave an analysis of such extensions of our framework and the role of BCC in these extended settings as future work.
Finally, let us mention another feature of our syntax that cannot be faithfully simulated by simpler means-that of appending a note to a forwarded message. Suppose that we allow instead only a ' simple' forward f (i, m, G) and simulate the current forward f (i, l.m, G) by a send and a simple forward, that is, by the sequence s (i, l, G), f (i, m, G) . Then the fact that the note l was "coupled" with m can in some circumstances provide a piece of additional information that becomes lost during the simulation. Here is a concrete example. We do not use BCC here, so each email m {∅} is written as m.
Example 7.5. Suppose that l 1 , l 2 ∈ L 1 and l 1 , l 2 ∈ L i for i = 1. Let m := s(1, l, 1) and
Then for all i we have s |= K 1 (K i m → K i l 2 ), that is, agent 1 knows that every agent who knows the message m also knows the note l 2 .
A simulation of these two messages with a simple forward would yield the state t with
Now consider a state t with:
Clearly t ∼ 1 t and t |= K 3 m ∧ ¬K 3 l 2 . This shows that t |= K 1 (K 3 m → K 3 l 2 ).
Note that this example exploits the fact that in our framework the agents can forward the notes that are 'buried' within the received emails (thanks to the references to l ∈ FI(m) in conditions L.2 or L.3 in Section 2.3), whereas they can only forward the messages they received. That is, they cannot forward messages that are "buried" within the emais they received. This natural restriction is satisfied by the email systems.
EMAIL EXCHANGES
Finally, we return to the issue of the synchronicity of the email communication mentioned in Section 3. To this end we introduce an operational semantics that also allows us to provide a characterization of the notion of a legal state in terms of email exchanges. In this setting emails are sent in a nondeterministic order, each time respecting the restrictions imposed by the legality conditions L.1-L.3 of Section 2.3.
This operational semantics is defined in the style of Plotkin [1982] , though with some important differences concerning the notions of a program state and the atomic transitions. Let M be the set of all messages (so not emails). By a mailbox we mean a function σ : Ag → P(M); σ (i) is then the mailbox of agent i. If for all i we have σ 0 (i) = ∅, then we call σ 0 the empty mailbox. A configuration is a construct of the form < s, σ >, where s is a legal state and σ is a mailbox.
Atomic transitions between configurations are of the form
where∪ denotes disjoint union and
We say that this transition processes the email m B . This takes place subject to the following conditions depending on the form of m, where L = (L 1 , . . . , L n ): s(i, l, G) .
We stipulate then that l ∈ L i or for some m ∈ σ (i) we have l ∈ FI(m ). In the second case of the second alternative we will say that m depends on m .
We stipulate then that m ∈ σ (i), and l ∈ L i or for some m ∈ σ (i) we have l ∈ FI(m ).
In the case of the first alternative we will say that m depends on m and in the case of the second alternative that m depends on m and m .
Given a legal state s an email exchange starting in s is a maximal sequence of transitions starting in the configuration < s, σ 0 >, where σ 0 is the empty mailbox. An email exchange properly terminates if its last configuration is of the form < s , τ >, where s = (∅, L). The way the atomic transitions are defined clarifies that the communication is synchronous.
Note that messages are never deleted from the mailboxes. Further, observe that in the given atomic transitions we augment the mailboxes of the recipients of m B (including the BCC recipients) by m and not by m B . So the recipients of m B only 'see' the message m in their mailboxes. Likewise, we augment the mailbox of the sender by the message m and not by m B . As a result when in an email exchange a sender forwards his own email, the BCC recipients of the original email are not shown in the forwarded email. This is consistent with the discussion of the emails given in Section 2.2.
Observe that from the form of a message m in the mailbox σ (i) we can infer whether agent i received it by means of a BCC. Namely, this is the case iff i ∈ R(m) ∪ S(m). (Recall that by assumption the sets of regular recipients and BCC recipients of an email are disjoint.)
The following result then clarifies the concept of a legal state.
THEOREM 8.1. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) s is a legal state, (2) an email exchange starting in s properly terminates, (3) all email exchanges starting in s properly terminate.
The equivalence between (1) and (2) states that the property of a legal state amounts to the possibility of processing all the emails in an orderly (and synchronous) fashion.
PROOF. Suppose s = (E, L).
(1) ⇒ (2). Suppose that s is a legal state. So conditions L.1-L.3 are satisfied with respect to an spo ≺. Extend ≺ to a linear ordering ≺ l on E. (Such an extension exists on the account of the result of Szpilrajn [1930] .) By the definition of the atomic transitions we can process the emails in E in the order determined by ≺ l . The resulting sequence of transitions forms a properly terminating email exchange starting in s.
(2) ⇒ (3). Let ξ be a properly terminating email exchange starting in s and ξ another email exchange starting in s. Let m B be the first email processed in ξ that is not processed in ξ . The final mailbox of ξ contains the message(s) on which m depends on, since their full versions were processed in ξ before m B and hence were also processed in ξ . So m B can be processed in the final mailbox of ξ , that is, ξ is not a maximal sequence. This is a contradiction.
(3) ⇒ (2). Obvious.
(2) ⇒ (1). Take a properly terminating email exchange ξ starting in s. Take the following spo ≺ on the emails of E: e 1 ≺ e 2 iff e 1 is processed in ξ before e 2 . By the definition of the atomic transitions conditions L.1-L.3 are satisfied w.r.t. ≺, so s is legal.
Intuitively, the equivalence between the first two conditions means that the legality of a state is equivalent to the condition that it is possible to execute its emails in a "coherent" way. Each terminating exchange entails a strict partial (in fact linear) ordering w.r.t. which conditions L.1-L.3 are satisfied.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Email is by now one of the most common forms of group communication. This motivates the study here presented. The language we introduced allowed us to discuss various fine points of email communication, notably forwarding and the use of BCC. The epistemic semantics we proposed aimed at clarifying the knowledge-theoretic consequences of this form of communication. Our presentation focused on the issues of epistemic content of the emails and common knowledge.
This framework also leads to natural questions concerning axiomatization of the introduced language and the decidability of its semantics. Currently we work on -a sound and complete axiomatization of the epistemic language L of Section 3; at this stage we have such an axiomatization for the non-epistemic formulas, -the problem of decidability of the truth definition given in Section 3; at this stage we have a decidability result for positive formulas and for formulas without nested epistemic operators, -a comparison of the proposed semantics with the one based on sequences ('histories') of emails rather than partially ordered sets of emails.
In our framework, as explained in Sections 3 and 8, communication is synchronous. This is of course a simplifying assumption and should be viewed as a first step in analyzing epistemic reasoning in email exchanges. We plan to extend our results to the more general framework of Ben-Zvi and Moses [2010] , by assuming for each agent a known time bound by which he reads his emails.
When moving to asynchronous communication we should be aware of the already mentioned result of Halpern and Moses [1990] that common knowledge of nontrivial facts cannot be achieved. In view of this negative result various weaker forms of common knowledge were proposed in the literature. In particular Neiger and Toueg [1993] introduced the concept of a timestamped common knowledge and proposed a communication primitive that achieves it. In turn, Panangaden and Taylor [1992] introduced the notion of a concurrent common knowledge defined using Lamport's causality notion. These variants could be studied for the case of email exchanges with asynchronous communication, taking the present framework as a departure point.
Communication by email suggests other forms of knowledge. Recently Sietsma [2012, Chapter 6] considered potential knowledge and definitive knowledge in the context of email exchanges. When a message is sent to an agent, that agent acquires potential knowledge of it. Only when he forwards the message, he acquires definitive knowledge of the message. The idea is that when a message is sent to an agent, one cannot be sure that he read it. Only when he forwards it, one can be certain that he did read it. The considered framework is an adaptation of the one presented here. The common knowledge is not considered but a decision procedure is presented for all considered epistemic formulas.
Another extension worthwhile to study is one in which the agents communicate richer basic statements than just notes. We already indicated in Section 7 that sending messages containing a formula i m increases the expressiveness of the messages from the epistemic point of view. One could also consider in our framework sending epistemic formulas, a feature recently studied [Sietsma and van Eijck 2011] in a setting with a finite number of messages and the BCC feature absent.
Finally, even though this study was limited to the epistemic aspects of email exchanges, it is natural to suggest here some desired features of emails. One is the possibility of forwarding a message in a provably intact form. This form of forward, used here, is present in the VM email system integrated into the emacs editor; in VM forward results in passing the message as an attachment that cannot be changed. Another, more pragmatic one and not considered here, is disabling the reply-all feature for the BCC recipients so that none of them can by mistake reveal that he was a BCC recipient. Yet another one is a feature that would simulate signing of a reception of a registered letter-opening such a 'registered email' would automatically trigger an acknowledgment. Such an acknowledgment would allow one to achieve in a simple way the aforementioned definitive knowledge.
